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// Copyright 2015-2017 Brian Smith.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
// SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
// OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
// CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
//! Key Agreement: ECDH, including X25519.
//!
//! # Example
//!
//! Note that this example uses X25519, but ECDH using NIST P-256/P-384 is done
//! exactly the same way, just substituting
//! `agreement::ECDH_P256`/`agreement::ECDH_P384` for `agreement::X25519`.
//!
//! ```
//! use ring::{agreement, rand};
//!
//! let rng = rand::SystemRandom::new();
//!
//! let my_private_key = agreement::EphemeralPrivateKey::generate(&agreement::X25519, &rng)?;
//!
//! // Make `my_public_key` a byte slice containing my public key. In a real
//! // application, this would be sent to the peer in an encoded protocol
//! // message.
//! let my_public_key = my_private_key.compute_public_key()?;
//!
//! let peer_public_key = {
//! // In a real application, the peer public key would be parsed out of a
//! // protocol message. Here we just generate one.
//! let peer_public_key = {
//! let peer_private_key =
//! agreement::EphemeralPrivateKey::generate(&agreement::X25519, &rng)?;
//! peer_private_key.compute_public_key()?
//! };
//!
//! agreement::UnparsedPublicKey::new(&agreement::X25519, peer_public_key)
//! };
//!
//! agreement::agree_ephemeral(
//! my_private_key,
//! &peer_public_key,
//! ring::error::Unspecified,
//! |_key_material| {
//! // In a real application, we'd apply a KDF to the key material and the
//! // public keys (as recommended in RFC 7748) and then derive session
//! // keys from the result. We omit all that here.
//! Ok(())
//! },
//! )?;
//!
//! # Ok::<(), ring::error::Unspecified>(())
//! ```
// The "NSA Guide" steps here are from from section 3.1, "Ephemeral Unified
// Model."
use crate::{cpu, debug, ec, error, rand};
pub use crate::ec::{
curve25519::x25519::X25519,
suite_b::ecdh::{ECDH_P256, ECDH_P384},
};
/// A key agreement algorithm.
pub struct Algorithm {
pub(crate) curve: &'static ec::Curve,
pub(crate) ecdh: fn(
out: &mut [u8],
private_key: &ec::Seed,
peer_public_key: untrusted::Input,
) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified>,
}
derive_debug_via_field!(Algorithm, curve);
impl Eq for Algorithm {}
impl PartialEq for Algorithm {
fn eq(&self, other: &Algorithm) -> bool {
self.curve.id == other.curve.id
}
}
/// An ephemeral private key for use (only) with `agree_ephemeral`. The
/// signature of `agree_ephemeral` ensures that an `EphemeralPrivateKey` can be
/// used for at most one key agreement.
pub struct EphemeralPrivateKey {
private_key: ec::Seed,
algorithm: &'static Algorithm,
}
derive_debug_via_field!(
EphemeralPrivateKey,
stringify!(EphemeralPrivateKey),
algorithm
);
impl EphemeralPrivateKey {
/// Generate a new ephemeral private key for the given algorithm.
pub fn generate(
alg: &'static Algorithm,
rng: &dyn rand::SecureRandom,
) -> Result<Self, error::Unspecified> {
let cpu_features = cpu::features();
// NSA Guide Step 1.
//
// This only handles the key generation part of step 1. The rest of
// step one is done by `compute_public_key()`.
let private_key = ec::Seed::generate(&alg.curve, rng, cpu_features)?;
Ok(Self {
private_key,
algorithm: alg,
})
}
/// Computes the public key from the private key.
#[inline(always)]
pub fn compute_public_key(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, error::Unspecified> {
// NSA Guide Step 1.
//
// Obviously, this only handles the part of Step 1 between the private
// key generation and the sending of the public key to the peer. `out`
// is what should be sent to the peer.
self.private_key
.compute_public_key()
.map(|public_key| PublicKey {
algorithm: self.algorithm,
bytes: public_key,
})
}
/// The algorithm for the private key.
#[inline]
pub fn algorithm(&self) -> &'static Algorithm {
self.algorithm
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.private_key.bytes_less_safe()
}
}
/// A public key for key agreement.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct PublicKey {
algorithm: &'static Algorithm,
bytes: ec::PublicKey,
}
impl AsRef<[u8]> for PublicKey {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.bytes.as_ref()
}
}
impl core::fmt::Debug for PublicKey {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
f.debug_struct("PublicKey")
.field("algorithm", &self.algorithm)
.field("bytes", &debug::HexStr(self.as_ref()))
.finish()
}
}
impl PublicKey {
/// The algorithm for the public key.
#[inline]
pub fn algorithm(&self) -> &'static Algorithm {
self.algorithm
}
}
/// An unparsed, possibly malformed, public key for key agreement.
pub struct UnparsedPublicKey<B: AsRef<[u8]>> {
algorithm: &'static Algorithm,
bytes: B,
}
impl<B: Copy> Copy for UnparsedPublicKey<B> where B: AsRef<[u8]> {}
impl<B: Clone> Clone for UnparsedPublicKey<B>
where
B: AsRef<[u8]>,
{
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
Self {
algorithm: self.algorithm,
bytes: self.bytes.clone(),
}
}
}
impl<B: core::fmt::Debug> core::fmt::Debug for UnparsedPublicKey<B>
where
B: AsRef<[u8]>,
{
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
f.debug_struct("UnparsedPublicKey")
.field("algorithm", &self.algorithm)
.field("bytes", &debug::HexStr(self.bytes.as_ref()))
.finish()
}
}
impl<B: AsRef<[u8]>> UnparsedPublicKey<B> {
/// Constructs a new `UnparsedPublicKey`.
pub fn new(algorithm: &'static Algorithm, bytes: B) -> Self {
Self { algorithm, bytes }
}
/// TODO: doc
#[inline]
pub fn algorithm(&self) -> &'static Algorithm {
self.algorithm
}
/// TODO: doc
#[inline]
pub fn bytes(&self) -> &B {
&self.bytes
}
}
/// Performs a key agreement with an ephemeral private key and the given public
/// key.
///
/// `my_private_key` is the ephemeral private key to use. Since it is moved, it
/// will not be usable after calling `agree_ephemeral`, thus guaranteeing that
/// the key is used for only one key agreement.
///
/// `peer_public_key` is the peer's public key. `agree_ephemeral` will return
/// `Err(error_value)` if it does not match `my_private_key's` algorithm/curve.
/// `agree_ephemeral` verifies that it is encoded in the standard form for the
/// algorithm and that the key is *valid*; see the algorithm's documentation for
/// details on how keys are to be encoded and what constitutes a valid key for
/// that algorithm.
///
/// `error_value` is the value to return if an error occurs before `kdf` is
/// called, e.g. when decoding of the peer's public key fails or when the public
/// key is otherwise invalid.
///
/// After the key agreement is done, `agree_ephemeral` calls `kdf` with the raw
/// key material from the key agreement operation and then returns what `kdf`
/// returns.
#[inline]
pub fn agree_ephemeral<B: AsRef<[u8]>, F, R, E>(
my_private_key: EphemeralPrivateKey,
peer_public_key: &UnparsedPublicKey<B>,
error_value: E,
kdf: F,
) -> Result<R, E>
where
F: FnOnce(&[u8]) -> Result<R, E>,
{
let peer_public_key = UnparsedPublicKey {
algorithm: peer_public_key.algorithm,
bytes: peer_public_key.bytes.as_ref(),
};
agree_ephemeral_(my_private_key, peer_public_key, error_value, kdf)
}
fn agree_ephemeral_<F, R, E>(
my_private_key: EphemeralPrivateKey,
peer_public_key: UnparsedPublicKey<&[u8]>,
error_value: E,
kdf: F,
) -> Result<R, E>
where
F: FnOnce(&[u8]) -> Result<R, E>,
{
// NSA Guide Prerequisite 1.
//
// The domain parameters are hard-coded. This check verifies that the
// peer's public key's domain parameters match the domain parameters of
// this private key.
if peer_public_key.algorithm != my_private_key.algorithm {
return Err(error_value);
}
let alg = &my_private_key.algorithm;
// NSA Guide Prerequisite 2, regarding which KDFs are allowed, is delegated
// to the caller.
// NSA Guide Prerequisite 3, "Prior to or during the key-agreement process,
// each party shall obtain the identifier associated with the other party
// during the key-agreement scheme," is delegated to the caller.
// NSA Guide Step 1 is handled by `EphemeralPrivateKey::generate()` and
// `EphemeralPrivateKey::compute_public_key()`.
let mut shared_key = [0u8; ec::ELEM_MAX_BYTES];
let shared_key = &mut shared_key[..alg.curve.elem_scalar_seed_len];
// NSA Guide Steps 2, 3, and 4.
//
// We have a pretty liberal interpretation of the NIST's spec's "Destroy"
// that doesn't meet the NSA requirement to "zeroize."
(alg.ecdh)(
shared_key,
&my_private_key.private_key,
untrusted::Input::from(peer_public_key.bytes),
)
.map_err(|_| error_value)?;
// NSA Guide Steps 5 and 6.
//
// Again, we have a pretty liberal interpretation of the NIST's spec's
// "Destroy" that doesn't meet the NSA requirement to "zeroize."
kdf(shared_key)
}